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INTRODUCTION 
Anthony Archuleta relies on his opening brief and he refers 
this Court to that brief for the statements of the issues, the 
case, and the facts. See Opening brief of Anthony Archuleta 
(hereinafter "Opening brief"), pages 1-14. Mr. Archuleta notes 
one change: on April 29, 1996, the Utah Supreme Court "poured-
over" this case to the Court of Appeals, which retains 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (k) . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The State did not prove and the trial court's findings did 
not establish the necessary factual circumstances for a 
warrantless entry. The findings failed to fully address the 
circumstances then in existence just before, or during, the time 
of the officers' entry into the home. In addition, the jury 
improperly considered evidence and "fruits" which should have 
been suppressed. The involved errors may neither be considered 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, nor is there any merit to the 
contention that there was no likelihood of a different result. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
INADEQUATE CIRCUMSTANCES FAILED TO JUSTIFY OR SUPPORT 
THE WARRANTLESS ENTRY INTO THE RESIDENCE 
(Reply to Points I & II of Appellee's brief) 
Critical to either the consent or exigency determination are 
the "totality" of the circumstances which were established 
factually below. See State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 689 (Utah 
1990); State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 19 (Utah App. 1993); 
Appellee's brief, Points I.A. & II.A. The State takes issue with 
appellant's factual arguments and it contends that when the 
factual circumstances are viewed "in the light most favorable to 
the verdict and ruling[,]" Appellee's brief, page 6 n.l, such 
circumstances support the court's legal conclusions. 
Contrary to the State's urgings, a lower court's findings 
are not necessarily entitled to the same deference on appeal as a 
jury's verdict: 
it is not accurate to say that the appellate court takes 
that view of the evidence that is most favorable to the 
appellee, that it assumes that all conflicts in the 
evidence were resolved in his favor, and that he must be 
given the benefit of all favorable inferences. All of 
this is true in reviewing a jury verdict. It is not 
true when it is the findings of the court that are being 
reviewed. Instead, the appellate court may examine all 
of the evidence in the record. 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987) (emphasis 
added and citation omitted), quoted in Opening brief, page 31 
n. 5. 
The State acknowledges appellant's argument "that the 
trial court's findings are incomplete and inadequate because 
2 
they fail to resolve the issue of whether the police had 
entered the home to detain Mr. [James] Archuleta . . . or 
whether Mr. Archuleta had come out of the home in response to 
the police's oral directive ..." Appellee's brief, page 
30. In response, the State claims, "the language of the 
findings make clear that the court accepted the officers' 
testimony over that of Mr. Archuleta; Officer Langley 
'directed' Mr. Archuleta out of the house; Mr. Archuleta 
'complied'; as he complied, he was 'watched.'" Appellee's 
brief, page 30 (emphasis added) (citing Findings of Fact, 
paragraph 5)-1 
The concern here goes beyond crediting a single 
officer's testimony over that of a defense witness. Cf. 
Opening brief, page 31 n.5.2 Since the officers themselves 
1
 Finding of Fact, paragraph 5 reads: 
Not knowing whose house the suspects had entered, Deputy 
Langley first summoned other deputies to be posted in a 
perimeter around the house to prevent escape, then he 
directed James Archuletta out of the house to be searched 
and interviewed. As Mr. Archuletta complied, he was watched 
at gunpoint as he exited the house, was made to lay prone on 
the front lawn, and upon being subjected to a pat-down 
search was found to not be in possession of any weapons. He 
was then allowed to stand, whereupon the deputies holstered 
their weapons or pointed them in non-threatening positions. 
(R 235-3 6) (emphasis added). 
2
 The State also criticizes counsel for his 
characterizations of the record. Appellee's brief, page 13. 
However, in terms of advocacy and interpretation--both of which 
emerge from the inadequate and questionable nature of the record, 
the State may be reading more into the argument than what was 
intended. For example, an accidental shooting was not the 
desired portrayal. See Appellee's brief, page 13. Rather, self 
defense is implicated when Bo Zahorka, a man who physically 
3 
differed in their stories, their own conflicting accounts 
present the dilemma of how the trial court could have 
"accepted" the officers testimony. State v. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991) ("Because of these contradictions 
in [police] testimony, it was critical for the trial judge to 
make an explicit ruling on the seizure . . . and to enter 
findings in the record resolving these factual disputes [as] 
[t]he credibility questions are more complex than simply 
resolving a conflict in testimony between defendant and the 
officers"); of. Appellee's brief, page 28 n.13 (wherein the 
State attempted to temper the inconsistencies by arguing that 
the record "reflects some conflicting but no contradictory 
testimony"). 
According to deputy Langley, he obtained James' consent 
before the detention. (R 293); Opening brief, pages 25-26. 
Sergeant Fred L. Smith, however, testified that the consent 
occurred only after the detemtion. (R 351) (consent was 
obtained "only after he [James] was brought out of his own 
home at gunpoint and laid face down onto the lawn while 
officers still had their guns drawn"); Opening brief, page 
24. 
outmatches Anthony, pushes him, Appellee's brief, page 11, and 
although Anthony had armed himself, he fired the gun only after 
Bo had lunged or was upon him. Opening brief, pages 6-7. In 
other instances, the State simply misreads his argument. See 
Appellee's brief, page 9 n.4. Bo's death was connected to 
Jeremy's death only because Anthony felt the need to have a gun 
for his protection. 
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Moreover, the trial court's finding adds to the 
confusion because it "accepts" deputy Langley's testimony 
that "he directed James Archuleta out of the house to be 
searched and interviewed[J" (R 235) (Finding of Fact, 
paragraph 5), even though Langley himself testified that his 
initial discussions occurred before James came out of the 
house. Opening brief, page 12; (R 2 93) ("I [Langley] spoke 
to him [James], advised him that we were investigating a 
crime that had occurred from across the street, that we had 
reason to believe that people involved in the crime had run 
into the house, that we needed to go into the house, and 
asked his permission to go look and see if the people we 
believed were there were inside").3 
The word used, "directed", is itself less appropriate 
for Langley's portrayal of an impassive request and more 
befitting of Sergeant Smith's authoritative order. (R 342) 
("We ordered them out of the residence at gunpoint"). 
In short, the trial court inconsistently credited deputy 
Langley for having "directed" James out of the house, while 
in the same clause the court discredited Langley's claim that 
his calm and polite interview with James had preceded such 
3
 As suggested by the trial court's findings, the extensive 
nature of the initial discussions also included James identifying 
himself as the owner of the house and James reporting that his 
son and a friend had recently entered the house and requested to 
be driven away. (R 293-94); (R 236) (Finding of Fact, paragraph 
7); cf. (R 236) (Finding of Fact, paragraph 8) (consent was 
obtained or agreed upon only after James had been informed that 
the deputies were searching for the persons involved in a 
shooting). 
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direction. (R 235) (Finding of Fact, paragraph 5); see supra 
note 3. The circumstances necessary to justify the 
warrantless entry were not established, at least as claimed 
by the officers, and the court failed to precisely set forth 
what had occurred. 
Consent and exigencies could not have both existed in 
the case at bar,4 but they did because the trial court 
improperly pieced together incompatible sections of 
conflicting officers' testimony. See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 
788 (reversal required as "only the most selective picking 
and choosing from among the officer's testimony could support 
such a conclusion"). The subsidiary factual findings 
provided an inadequate basis for the trial court's legal 
conclusions. 
To avoid repetition, Anthony Archuleta also continues to 
maintain his arguments previously briefed. See Opening 
brief, Points A & B. The motion to suppress should have been 
granted. 
4
 No exigency existed Lf the officers had the time to first 
pause longer enough to politely question James Archuleta about 
who /he was, where the suspects were, and what had been said, see 
supra note 1 and text accompanying note, as well as to realize 
that no legitimate safety concerns then existed. Opening brief, 
pages 19-20. Consent also was not validly obtained if officers 
had hurriedly and forcibly opened the front door, pulled the 
phone out of James' hand, and yanked him outside. Opening brief, 
pages 24, 32-36. 
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POINT II 
REVERSAL IS REQUIRED BECAUSE OF THE JURY'S IMPROPER 
CONSIDERATION OF EVIDENCE WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
SUPPRESSED 
(Reply to Point III of Appellee's brief) 
The State lastly argues that "any alleged erroneous 
admission of the physical evidence seized would be harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt." Appellee's brief, page 40. It 
speculates that "[t]he jury did not base its verdict on the 
admission of the murder weapon and ammunition, but on the 
eyewitness accounts of the shooting." Appellee's brief, page 45. 
Such a claim is doubtful, however, given the manner in which the 
State presented its case and the number of witnesses who 
admittedly did not actually see the shooting.5 
More important, while the State correctly argues that 
"physical evidence" was involved, Anthony Archuleta moved for "an 
order suppressing all evidence seized. . ." (R 28) (emphasis 
added). " [T]he word 'evidence' is a comprehensive term, 
embracing not only testimony, or the statements of witnesses, but 
also . . . whatever may be submitted to a court or a jury to 
5
 According to the State, "many bystanders were aware of 
the escalating confrontation. Some wanted to leave (R. 777); one 
wanted to call the police (R. 884); another ducked behind his car 
and pretended to check his tires (R. 827, 828-29). But the ones 
that watched saw defendant shoot Bo Zahorka (R. 812-13, 823-24; 
829)." Appellee's brief, page 11. Bystanders are different than 
eyewitnesses, though, particularly when the bystanders were not 
in a position to actually see the shooting. See (R 829) (Robert 
Beeler did not see the shooting, but "when I heard a loud noise 
[gun fire], then I looked up over the hood of my car [since he 
was checking his tires]"); (R'823-24) (Raymond Rudd said only, "I 
seen the littlest of the two fellows, it looked like he hit the 
big guy in the chest[,]" and Raymond said nothing about a gun). 
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elucidate an issue or prove a case." Hansen v. Owens, 619 P. 2d 
315, 321 n.4 (Utah 1980) ; cf. id. (quoting from a rule then in 
effect, the opinion also noted, "'Evidence,' as used in these 
rules, includes the means, oral, documentary or physical, used as 
proof on issues of fact"). 
When Mr. Archuleta had sought to exclude only physical 
evidence, for other matters he had said so. See (R 13 6) (in his 
"Motion in Limine", he expressly listed the "items of physical 
evidence" at issue). By comparison, no such physical limitations 
were listed in his "Motion to Suppress Illegally Seized 
Evidence". (R 28). 
In the case at bar, the State does not argue harmless error 
for the improper admission of evidence other than the gun and 
ammunition (nor for the cumulative effect of all of the involved 
evidence). Indeed, the prosecution below emphasized virtually 
everything about the case which had occurred after the shooting. 
See (R 582-768) (the prosecution's case-in-chief repeatedly 
addressed what police officers or state employees had heard, 
observed, or otherwise considered as a result of the evidence 
obtained from the warrantless entry into the home). 
The after-the-shooting evidence may have provided some 
foundational aspects of the State's case, see, e.g., (R 689) 
(medical examiner's testimony), but if the fact finding mission 
was truly directed towards the actions and mental state then in 
existence at the precise moment of the shooting, the after-the-
fact evidence amounted to little more than an impassioned 
8 
distraction for the jury.6 
The State's case hinged on more than eyewitness testimony 
and the evidence as a whole was not overwhelming. The jurors 
themselves did not believe everything was clear cut --a fact 
evidenced by their note to the court which suggested that they 
were struggling with whether Anthony had acted "unlawfully". (R 
228) (juror note asking court to "define unlawfully as used in 
the instruction. . . " ) . At the very least, the testimonial 
evidence of the officers participating in the illegal entry (as 
well as other state employees involved thereafter) may not be 
considered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. All of the 
6
 See, e.g., State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985) 
(after the fact conduct, even actions deemed "reprehensible", 
were not relevant to the defendant's state of mind at the time of 
the incident); State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 495 n.13 (Utah App. 
1991) (another after the fact consideration, flight, is an 
inadequate basis for creating an articulable suspicion for a 
stop). 
In any event, the gun and ammunition still played an 
important role in the jury's deliberation. Immediately before 
the shooting, Bo responded to the gun by saying, "What are you 
going [to] do, you little punk?" (R 964). The State claims Bo's 
statement was made with a laugh. Appellee's brief, page 11; but 
see Appellee's brief, page 46 (citing [R 882-84; 964; 1030] 
Anthony was frightened by, and fearful of, Bo Zahorka). Unlike 
Bo's claimed reaction to the gun, the jury may have responded 
differently if the gun had been suppressed. For instance, the 
jurors reaction to actually seeing the size of the gun (as 
opposed to being told about it or looking at an enlarged picture) 
may have been one of fear or amusement. The jury then may have 
credited the "little punk" statement as being a threatening dare 
or a joke, either one of which was the basis for Anthony's 
response and his mental state. Viewing the gun in evidence and 
visually placing it in Anthony's hand at trial also gave the jury 
an opportunity to perceive how Anthony had handled the gun and 
the manner in which it may have been flashed, used, or withdrawn. 
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illegally seized evidence submitted to the jury "to elucidate an 
issue or prove a case" should have been suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Archuleta respectfully requests this Court to reverse 
the conviction and remand his case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this _/ day of May, 1996. 
RONALD S. FUJJINO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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